

Message Text

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INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 3546

USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY MADRID

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

USCINCEUR

USNMR SHAPE

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E.O. 11652: GDS-12/31/81

TAGS: PFOR, NATO

SUBJECT: DPC MINISTERIAL MEETING DECEMBER 7, 1973: SECDEF STATEMENT
FOR THE RECORD

VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR; GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF REMARKS OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SCHLESINGER PRESENTED FOR THE RECORD AT THE DEFENSE
PLANNING COMMITTEE MEETING AT NATO, DECEMBER 7, 1973:

BEGIN TEXT:

MR. CHAIRMAN:

THIS MEETING COMES AT A TIME OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE FOR
THE ALLIANCE, A TIME WHEN THERE IS A FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION
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BEFORE US. THE QUESTION IS: WHERE ARE WE GOING AS AN ALLIANCE?
DO WE HAVE THE WILL -- WE CERTAINLY HAVE THE CAPACITY -- TO
CONTINUE TO STAND TOGETHER IN DEFENSE OF OUR COMMON INTERESTS?

FOR A QUARTER OF A CENTURY NATO HAS SPLENDIDLY PERFORMED ITS PRIMARY AND ESSENTIAL FUNCTION -- HELPING TO GUARANTEE THE PEACE IN EUROPE. IT HAS HAD THE STRONG SUPPORT OF THE VAST MAJORITY OF OUR PEOPLE IN THIS TASK. NOW, HOWEVER, YOU MUST SENSE, AS I DO, A SUSPICION AMONG OUR PUBLICS THAT THE ALLIANCE MAY BE MORE RELEVANT TO THE PAST THAN TO THE FUTURE. IN THE UNITED STATES, THERE IS A GROWING FEELING THAT EUROPE IS ABLE BUT NOT WILLING TO TAKE WESTERN SECURITY AS SERIOUSLY AS THE UNITED STATES DOES, NOR IS EUROPE WILLING TO ACCEPT THE FINANCIAL AND MANPOWER OBLIGATIONS TO DEFENSE THAT OUGHT, IN FAIRNESS, TO FLOW FROM NOW FULLY RECOVERED ECONOMIES. WE CANNOT ALLOW THESE ATTITUDES TO PERSIST IF WE ARE TO SUSTAIN AN ADEQUATE DEFENSE POSTURE. I BELIEVE WE CAN CHANGE THESE ATTITUDES.

FOR OUR PART, THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO CONTINUE TO TAKE THE NECESSARY SECURITY MEASURES TO HELP SUSTAIN WESTERN SECURITY PROVIDED THAT OUR ALLIES MAKE A SIMILAR EFFORT. WITH THIS IN MIND, MY STATEMENT AT THE LAST DPC MEETING WAS INTENDED TO BEGIN A DIALOGUE AIMED AT ACHIEVING TWO FUNDAMENTAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES:

FIRST, THE CONSTRUCTION OF A SATISFACTORY BASIS FOR MAINTAINING AN ADEQUATE OVERALL NATO SECURITY POSTURE FOR THE LONG HAUL, INCLUDING BALANCED FORCES WITH RATIONAL MISSIONS CREDIBLE TO OUR ADVERSARIES AND OURSELVES.

SECOND, AN EQUITABLE ADJUSTMENT OF BURDENS TO PUT UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION IN NATO, AND THE UNITED STATES MILITARY PRESENCE IN EUROPE, ON A SOLID, DURABLE FOUNDATION ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS AND PUBLIC, AND TO OUR ALLIES.

EVERYTHING THAT WE HAVE SET OUT TO DO SINCE LAST JUNE WAS DESIGNED TO SERVE THESE PURPOSES -- TO MAKE THE SECURITY POSTURE OF THE ALLIANCE EITHER MORE EFFECTIVE, OR MORE EQUITABLE, OR BOTH. I INCLUDE HERE OUR DISCUSSIONS OF THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE, THE WORK ON FORCE IMPROVEMENTS, SPECIALIZATION, BURDEN SHARING, AND OF COURSE THE INTENSE PREPARATIONS FOR MBFR.

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THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE

THE MATTER OF THE CONVENTIONAL FORCE BALANCE, UPON WHICH I DWELT AT SOME LENGTH LAST JUNE, AND WHICH I HAVE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS AT LENGTH WITH A NUMBER OF MINISTERS IN THE INTERVENING MONTHS, IS INTIMATELY BOUND TO BOTH OBJECTIVES.

A STRONG CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY IS MORE THAN EVER NECESSARY IN AN ERA WHEN THE STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL NUCLEAR RESOURCES OF THE ALLIANCE ARE APPROXIMATELY MATCHED BY OUR POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES. WE CANNOT PERMIT THE WARSAW TACT TO HAVE A GREATER RANGE OF FORCE OPTIONS THAN NATO.

MORE IMMEDIATELY, FOR THE UNITED STATES, IF THERE IS NO STRONG CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY, THEN THERE IS NO RATIONAL BASIS FOR KEEPING UNITED STATES FORCES IN EUROPE IN THEIR PRESENT NUMBERS. I CANNOT MAKE THE POINT TOO STRONGLY: THE UNITED STATES MUST SHOW A VIABLE MISSION FOR ITS CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE, OTHERWISE THEY WILL BE LEGISLATED HOME. IF NATO'S CONVENTIONAL FORCES ARE CONSIDERED TO HAVE ONLY A CAPACITY TO BE A TRIP-WIRE FOR CUCLEAR WAR -- AND THIS IS WHAT A 3-7 DAY CAPABILITY WOULD IMPLY -- THEN I WOULD BE HARD PRESSED TO SUPPORT THE PRESENT LEVEL OF AMERICAN FORCES STATIONED IN EUROPE.

TO CARRY FORWARD OUR EFFORTS TO BUILD AND MAINTAIN A FULLY ADEQUATE CONVENTIONAL POSTURE, WE NEED COMMON UNDERSTANDING WITHIN NATO OF WHAT THE CURRENT CAPABILITIES OF NATO CONVENTIONAL FORCES ARE. A DETAILED, REALISTIC APPRAISAL IS REQUIRED IF WE ARE TO MAKE BEST USE OF OUR RESOURCES.

TO CONTRIBUTE TOWARD THIS GOAL, THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HAS PRESENTED OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS A BRIEFING ON STUDIES WE HAVE CONDUCTED OF THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE. THE STUDIES WE HAVE PREPARED DO NOT PRETEND TO BE THE FINAL WORD ON THE BALANCE, ALTHOUGH THEY ARE BASED ON THE LATEST AVAILABLE DATA AND, IN MY JUDGEMENT, ON REASONABLE, THOROUGHLY DEVELOPED AND ARGUED ASSUMPTIONS.

WE RECOGNIZE, OF COURSE, THE NEED TO INCORPORATE IN THE SECRET

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ANALYSIS OF GROUND CAPABILITIES CERTAIN ASPECTS SUCH AS THE LOGISTICS CAPABILITIES ON BOTH SIDES, THE TACTICAL AIR BALANCE IN THE CENTER REGION, AND THE CRITICAL AIR-GROUND INTERACTION. I SHOULD POINT OUT, HOWEVER, THAT THE SEPARATE WORK WE HAVE DONE SO FAR ON LOGISTICS AND ON AIR FORCES (DRAWING CHIEFLY ON NATO'S OWN SGTA STUDY) REINFORCES OUR VIEW THAT THE NATO CONVENTIONAL OPTION IS FAR FROM BEING A HOPELESS ONE, AND THAT ALLIANCE CAPABILITIES COVER A WIDER SPECTRUM OF CIRCUMSTANCES THAN HAS PREVIOUSLY BEEN UNDERSTOOD.

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SOME HAVE EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS THAT THE BRIEFINGS PRESENTED ONLY THE SO-CALLED "30/23" CASE, THAT IS, 30 DAYS MOBILIZATION TIME FOR THE PACT AND 23 DAYS FOR NATO. THE SHORTER WARNING CASES DESERVE MORE DETAILED STUDY. THESE CASES SHOULD BE BASED ON REALISTIC ASSUMPTIONS. WE, FOR OUR PART, ARE DOING THIS. WE WILL PRESENT THE RESULTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. HOWEVER, WE DO CONSIDER THE TZEPIXWEZ CASE A REASONABLE ONE, AND HAVE BASED OUR PLANNING ON IT.

I HAVE HEARD SOME PEOPLE SAY THAT THE AMERICAN VIEW OF THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE WILL ALLOW THE INFERENCE TO BE DRAWN THAT NATO FORCES ARE WHOLLY ADEQUATE AND THAT BUDGET AND FORCE REDUCTIONS, EITHER BY THE US OR BY THE OTHER ALLIES, WOULD NOT BE DAMAGING. SUCH AN INFERENCE WOULD, IN FACT, BE WHOLLY INCONSISTENT WITH THE AMERICAN VIEW.

-- OUR VIEW DEPENDS ON THE CURRENT LEVEL OF ALLIANCE
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FORCES. IF THESE FORCES ARE REDUCED IN ANY SIGNIFICANT WAY, OUR ANALYSIS WILL NOT HOLD.

-- IF NATO DOES NOT KEEP PACE IN MODERNIZATION, THE ANALYSIS WILL NOT HOLD.

-- IF OUR FORCES ARE NOT READY, OR DO NOT HAVE EFFECTIVE WEAPONS, OR CANNOT OUTLAST THE PACT LOGISTICALLY, OR CANNOT WORK EFFECTIVELY TOGETHER, THEN THE ANALYSIS WILL NOT HOLD.

ALL OF THESE CONDITIONS -- MAINTAINING THE FORCE STRUCTURE, MODERNIZATION, READINESS, BUILDING SUFFICIENT RESERVE STOCKS, COMMAND AND CONTROL -- TAKE A CONTINUED INFLUX OF FUNDS.

THERE ARE ALSO RISKS AND UNCERTAINTIES IN THE ANALYSIS.

THEY PERTAIN TO READINESS, TO RESPONSIVENESS, THE PARTICIPATION OF THE FRENCH FORCES, AND WEAPONS EFFECTIVENESS. NONE OF THESE RISKS PERMITS US TO REDUCE OUR FORCES OR THE TEMPO OF OUR MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS.

WE WELCOME A CONTINUED NATO DIALOGUE ON THE BALANCE. BUT WE WANT A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE, A "BALANCED" VIEW OF THE BALANCE, ONE THAT TAKES ACCOUNT OF PACT WEAKNESSES AS WELL AS STRENGTHS, AND ALLIED STRENGTHS AS WELL AS WEAKNESSES. WE WANT IT BASED ON THE LATEST AVAILABLE DATA, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE IMPROVEMENTS WE HAVE MADE IN ALLIANCE FORCES IN RECENT YEARS.

IN THE PREPARATION OF MC-161 NEXT YEAR, I HAVE DIRECTED MY STAFFS TO STRIVE FOR A FINELY BALANCED, OBJECTIVE ASSESSMENT -- ONE THAT REFLECTS PACT VULNERABILITIES AND WEAKNESSES AS WELL AS PACT STRENGTHS. WE EXPECT TO INTRODUCE REVISED JUDGMENTS AS TO PACT MOVEMENT CAPABILITIES, THE COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS OF UNDER-STRENGTH UNITS, AND LOGISTICS, AND A GREATER RANGE OF SCENARIOS.

A SECOND STEP WILL BE TO ASSESS WHAT RESOURCES THE ALLIANCE HAS DEVOTED TO ITS CONVENTIONAL FORCES. THIS INCLUDES ALL THE MEN AND EQUIPMENT ON WHICH MONEY IS SPENT IN OUR DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENTS, NOT JUST ON THOSE PORTIONS COMMITTED TO NATO, AND NOT JUST M-DAY FORCES IN PLACE. ALL OUR RESOURCES MUST BE
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TAKEN INTO PROPER ACCOUNT -- AS THEY SURELY ARE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT BY PACT PLANNERS.

WE HAVE MADE A GREAT DEAL OF OUR DATA AVAILABLE ALREADY. ALSO, WE HAVE SUGGESTED THAT GENERAL DISTRIBUTION TO CAPITALS OF THE HERETOFORE "SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION TABLES" OF THE DPQ REPLIES WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO A BETTER COMMON APPRECIATION OF THE SUBSTANTIAL EFFORTS OF EACH COUNTRY. I HAVE ASKED THAT U.S. SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION TABLES BE GENERALLY DISTRIBUTED AND I HOPE THAT OTHER NATIONS WILL FOLLOW SUIT. IF MORE DATA ARE NEEDED, WE ARE PREPARED TO HELP SUPPLY THEM.

WE NOTE THAT THE MILITARY COMMITTEE IS INITIATING A STUDY OF WARSAW PACT AND NATO CONVENTIONAL FORCE CAPABILITIES. WE HOPE THIS STUDY WILL BE A USEFUL CONTRIBUTION TO THE ONGOING STUDY PROCESS. WE EXPECT TO SEE ALL ASSUMPTIONS REOPENED, QUESTIONED, ARGUED. THE BEST MILITARY JUDGEMENT SHOULD BE APPLIED, IN A PROFESSIONAL AND EVEN-HANDED MANNER. WE DO NOT EXPECT TO SEE CAPABILITIES ATTRIBUTED TO THE PACT WHICH MILITARY JUDGEMENT WOULD NOT ATTRIBUTE TO EQUIVALENT NATO FORCES. WE HOPE TO SEE THE SAME SOPHISTICATION AND THOROUGHNESS THAT WE BELIEVE CHARACTERIZED OUR OWN STUDIES. (A PARTICULARLY EXEMPLARY STUDY IS THAT OF THE MBFR SUBGROUP ON TACTICAL AIR, WHICH WE DREW ON FULLY, AND WHICH WE EXPECT THE MC TO TAKE FULLY INTO ACCOUNT). THE MILITARY COMMITTEE STUDY SHOULD HAVE

NATIONAL PARTICIPATION AND FREQUENT REVIEW IN CAPITALS.

IN SUMMARY, IT HAS BEEN THE U.S VIEW THAT AS SOVIET STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES GROW TO PARITY WITH THE UNITED STATES -- A POINT THAT MAY WELL BE REACHED BY THE LATTER YEARS OF THIS DECADE AS THE SOVIET UNION DEPLOYS A MIRV CAPABILITY -- DETERRENCE WILL BE MUCH MORE CERTAIN IF THE SOVIETS PERCEIVE THAT THERE IS A BALANCE IN THE NATO DETERRENT TRIAD OF CONVENTIONAL , TACTICAL NUCLEAR, AND STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES. THE PACT SHOULD HAVE NO LOW-RISK OPTION FOR ATTACK ON EUROPE.

DETERRENCE IS STRENGTHENED BY CLOSING OFF, IN THE SOVIET MIND, THE CONVENTIONAL OPTION.

IN OUR VIEW, THE ALLIANCE HAS THE ESSENTIAL RESOURCES TO ACHIEVE AN ADEQUATE CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY WITHIN THESE NEXT
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CRUCIAL FEW YEARS PROVIDED WE KEEP UP AND DO NOT DIMINISH OUR DEFENSE EFFORTS.

FORCE IMPROVEMENTS

IN THIS REGARD, I PROPOSED LAST JUNE CERTAIN FORCE IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS WHICH, IN THE U.S. JUDGMENT, WERE THE FIRST PRIORITY OF THE AD-70 RECOMMENDATIONS. THESE PROGRAMS - AIRCRAFT PROTECTION, ANTITANK WEAPONS AND WAR RESERVE STOCKS - WERE THOSE WE THOUGHT OFFERED THE BEST HOPE OF SUBSTANTIAL NEAR-TERM IMPROVEMENTS IN NATO CAPABILITY AT MANAGEABLE ADDITIONAL COST.

THERE HAS BEEN A CONSIDERABLE MEASURE OF AGREEMENT ON THESE PROGRAMS WITHIN THE NATO COUNCILS. WE SHOULD NOW GET ON WITH DEFINITE PROGRAMS. WE SHOULD ENSURE THE CONTINUATION OF THE SHELTER PROGRAM WHILE WE EXAMINE FURTHER THE MERITS OF FULL COVERAGE FOR ALL NATO AIRCRAFT. THE EWG BASIC ISSUES REPORT RECOMMENDATION THAT INFRASTRUCTURE FUNDING FOR 70 PER CENT SHELTERS BE EXTENDED TO M PLUS 3 EARMARKED AIRCRAFT IS A STEP FORWARD. IT IS WORTH REMEMBERING THE STRONG DETERRENT EFFECT THE PRESENCE OF SHELTERS AND AIR DEFENSES HAD ON AIR BASE ATTACKS IN THE RECENT WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

WE STRONGLY WELCOME THE EXECUTIVE WORKING GROUP'S SUPPORT FOR ALL POSSIBLE COOPERATION IN INCREASING COLLOCATED BASES FOR THE BEDDOWN OF UNITED STATES AUGMENTATION AIRCRAFT. HERE IS A HIGHLY VISIBLE AND INEXPENSIVE WAY TO SHOW PROGRESS IN SHARING DEFENSE BURDENS WHILE INCREASING GREATLY THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ALLIED FORCES OVERALL.
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USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY MADRID

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

USCINCEUR

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WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE GREATER AND MORE EXPLICIT EFFORTS TO PROVIDE INFANTRY ANTITANK WEAPONS, BOTH TO REPLACE OLDER WEAPONS AND TO INCREASE THEIR DESITY WITHIN UNITS. THE AGREE-
MENT TO REPLACE OLDER WEAPONS ON A ONE-FOR-ONE BASIS IS A USEFUL STEP. THE GREATEST DISPARITY BETWEEN NATO AND THE PACT IS IN TANKS. WE NEED TO MAKE UP THIS DISPARITY. WE ARE UNLIKELY TO MAKE IT UP WITH TANKS ALONE. IT CAN BE DONE IN A PERCEIVABLE WAY WITH MODERN INFANTRY ANTITANK WEAPONS. WHILE WE WANT TO BE CAUTIOUS ABOUT DRAWING LESSONS PREMATURELY FROM THE RECENT ARAB-ISRAELI FIGHTING, ONE THING THAT WAS STRONGLY REAFFIRMED BY THAT CONFLICT IS THE VALUE OF ANTI-TANK WEAPONS IN QUANTITY.

WE SHOULD STRIVE HARDER TO ACHIEVE EARLY CONSENSUS ON COMMON MEASURES AND CRITERIA AND A COMMON POLICY FOR WAR RESERVE STOCKS. AS A GENERAL GUIDELINE, NATO OUGHT TO HAVE, AND TO BE SEEN TO HAVE, STOCKS SUFFICIENT TO OUTLAST THE PACT. THE EWG RECOMMENDATIONS ON THIS SUBJECT REPRESENT USEFUL BUT LIMITED
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PROGRESS. FOR EXAMPLE, WE HAVE AGREED TO DEVELOP COMMON STANDARDS AND TO PROVIDE A 30-DAY LEVEL BY THE END OF 1975; MOREOVER, WE HAVE AGREED TO IDENTIFY OUR MOST CRITICALLY NEEDED MUNITIONS AND TO FORMULATE PROGRAMS TO FULFILL THOSE NEEDS. WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO DO EVEN BETTER, AND TO AGREE ON THE DIRECTION OF FUTURE ACTION.

WITH REGARD TO SPECIALIZATION, A MODEST BEGINNING HAS BEEN MADE. THE INITIAL EFFORT HAS UNDERSTANDABLY CONCENTRATED ON THE SPECIFIC PROBLEMS OF EQUIPMENT REPLACEMENT RAISED BY OUR DUTCH FRIENDS. AT THE SAME TIME, THE WORK DONE HAS SERVED TO ILLUMINATE THE BROADER POTENTIAL OF SPECIALIZATION. THERE ARE TRADE-OFFS THAT SHOULD ENABLE US TO GET A MORE EFFECTIVE COLLECTIVE DEFENSE FROM OUR INEVITABLY LIMITED RESOURCES. WE WILL HAVE SOME SPECIFIC PROPOSALS TO MAKE IN THIS REGARD, WHICH WE WILL TABLE EARLY IN THE NEW YEAR, IN TIME FOR CONSIDERATION AT OUR NEXT MEETING.

PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE TOWARD REORGANIZING OUR AIR RESOURCES IN THE CENTER REGION TO PERMIT BETTER APPLICATION OF AIR POWER. HOWEVER, THE PROGRESS HAS BEEN SLOW AND THE JOB SEEMS FAR FROM DONE. A PROMPT AND ENERGETIC FOLLOW-THROUGH IS NEEDED IF THERE IS IN FACT TO BE THE GENUINE INCREASE IN FLEXIBILITY THAT WE SEEK.

BURDENSARING

TURNING NOW TO BURDENSARING; YOU ARE WELL AWARE HOW PRESSING A MATTER THIS IS WITH THE AMERICAN CONGRESS. THE JACKSON-NUNN AMENDMENT HAS BECOME LAW, AND MY GOVERNMENT IS REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE 100 PER CENT OFFSET FOR OUR FY 1974 MILITARY BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEFICIT, OR TO MAKE PROPORTIONATE REDUCTIONS IN OUR FORCES IN EUROPE. THAT SAME AMENDMENT EXPRESSES THE SENSE OF THE CONGRESS THAT THERE MUST BE A MORE EQUITABLE SHARING OF THE DEFENSE BURDEN IN BUDGETARY AS WELL AS BALANCE OF PAYMENTS TERMS. THIS SEEMS TO ME TO BE A FAIR REQUEST ON THE PART OF THE UNITED STATES.

WE HAVE BEEN IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE FRG FOR A NUMBER OF MONTHS NOW, AND WE ARE HOPEFUL THAT A SATISFACTORY OFFSET AGREEMENT FOR 1974 AND 1975 WILL BE ACHIEVED IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

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WE HAD HOPED THAT THE OTHER ALLIES WOULD HAVE BY NOW MADE A MULTILATERAL BURDENSARING PROPOSAL, BUT THIS HAS NOT BEEN THE CASE. USEFUL WORK HAS BEEN DONE IN NATO COUNCILS IN COMPILING THE DATA AND IN SUGGESTING A RANGE OF MEASURES THAT MIGHT CONTRIBUTE TO A SOLUTION, BUT NO PROPOSAL HAS BEEN MADE. IN LIGHT OF THIS, WE CAME FORWARD ON 29 NOVEMBER WITH SUGGESTIONS OF OUR OWN FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION. WE DO NOT PUT THEM FORWARD RIGIDLY, AND WE WELCOME DISCUSSION AND ALTERNATIVE SUGGESTIONS IF OTHER ARRANGEMENTS SEEM MORE APPROPRIATE. IF ACCOUNT IS TAKEN OF AN AGREEMENT WITH THE FRG WHICH FULLY OFFSETS THE PART OF THE BOP DEFICIT ATTRIBUTABLE TO STATIONING FORCES WITHIN GERMANY AND OF THE ANNUAL EFFORTS ALREADY MADE BY THE ALLIES INDIVIDUALLY, THE REMAINING DEFICIT IS NOT UNDULY LARGE, AND WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO FIND REASONABLE WAYS TO BRIDGE THE GAP.

IT APPEARS THAT PRESENT PLANS BY OUR ALLIES FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT IN THE U.S. WILL GO A LONG WAY TOWARD MEETING THE SUM FOR BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEFICIT MENTIONED IN OUR ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE. THE REMAINDER, WHICH WE CALL BUDGETARY SUPPORT, APPEARS TO BE ATTAINABLE, ESPECIALLY SINCE AN APPRECIABLE PART OF IT COULD BE MET BY THE REDUCTIONS WE HAVE REQUESTED IN THE U.S. SHARE OF NATO'S MILITARY AND CIVIL BUDGETS, IN THE DEFICIT OF THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN PIPELINE, AND IN THE U.S. SHARE OF THE INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM -- TOGETHER WITH THE ADDITION OF AN INFRASTRUCTURE CATEGORY IN SUPPORT OF FORCES STATIONED OUTSIDE THEIR OWN TERRITORY.

THE JACKSON-NUNN AMENDMENT REQUIRES THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO REPORT TO CONGRESS ON PROGRESS IN BURDENSARING BY MID-FEBRUARY 1974 AND AT SUBSEQUENT 90-DAY INTERVALS. FOR THAT REASON I WOULD ASK THAT DECISIONS BE REACHED BEFORE MID-FEBRUARY ON THESE REDUCTIONS IN THE U.S. SHARES OF COMMON-FUNDED PROGRAMS. THIS WOULD ENABLE US TO INCLUDE POSITIVE ACTIONS IN THAT FIRST REPORT.

FOR THE LONGER RUN, I STRONGLY URGE THAT WE CONSTRUCT A FORMULA THAT WILL PERMIT AN AUTOMATIC ADJUSTMENT OF BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEFICITS ON DEFENSE ACCOUNT, SO THAT NO COUNTRY SUFFERS IN THIS WAY BECAUSE OF ITS DEFENSE CONTRIBUTION TO THE ALLIANCE. NATURALLY, IN DEVISING SUCH A FORMULA, ACCOUNT
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WILL HAVE TO BE TAKEN OF THE OVERALL BALANCE OF PAYMENTS CONDITION OF EACH COUNTRY. BUT AUTOMATIC ARRANGEMENTS OUGHT TO BE ACHIEVABLE, AND I RECOMMEND THAT THIS BE THE NEXT ORDER OF BUSINESS AFTER WE COMPLETE THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS. I DO NOT HAVE TO TELL YOU THAT OUR FAILURE SO FAR TO ACHIEVE A MORE EQUITABLE SHARING OF DEFENSE RESPONSIBILITIES AMONG MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE, AND OUR INABILITY TO FIND AN AUTOMATIC MECHANISM FOR OFFSETTING OUR CHRONIC BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEFICIT, ARE CONFOUNDING THE EFFORTS OF MY GOVERNMENT TO FOCUS THE ANNUAL DEFENSE DEBATE IN THE CONGRESS ON POLITICAL AND SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS RATHER THAN ON NARROW FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES.

MBFR

IN VIENNA, MBFR TALKS ARE OFF TO A FAST, SUBSTANTIVE START. IT IS TOO EARLY TO DRAW HARD AND FAST CONCLUSIONS ABOUT FUTURE PACE, PROBLEMS, AND PROSPECTS. BUT WE CAN IDENTIFY ELEMENTS THAT WE SHOULD BEAR IN MIND AS WE PROCEED.
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USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY MADRID

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USCINCEUR

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IT IS, FIRST OF ALL, NOTABLE THAT THE EAST QUICKLY TABLED A PROPOSAL, AND ONE LESS OUTRAGEOUS THAN IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN. THE EAST CLEARLY HAS INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES WHICH IT INTENDS TO PURSUE ACTIVELY IN NEGOTIATIONS, RATHER THAN SITTING BACK AND LETTING THE WEST MAKE THE RUNNING. THIS PROVIDES US OPENINGS AND OPPORTUNITIES. BUT IT ALSO PLACES AN INCREASED PREMIUM ON EFFICIENCY, FIRMNESS, AND COHESION IN ALLIED CONDUCT OF NEGOTIATIONS. THIS MAKES IT ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT THAT THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL IN PERMANENT SESSION CONTINUE ITS THOUGHTFUL AND RESPONSIVE ROLE IN MEETING THE NEEDS OF THE SITUATION NOW THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE UNDERWAY. WE SHOULD ALSO SEE TO IT THAT THE ALLIED AD HOC GROUP CONTINUES TO RECEIVE THE HELP IT NEEDS TO GET THE JOB DONE. IT HAS PERFORMED SPLENDIDLY THUS FAR.

SECONDLY, THE KEY ELEMENTS OF THE JOB WILL BE TO HOLD HARD TO OUR OBJECTIVES OF A MORE STABLE BALANCE AND TO THE SECRET

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CRITERION OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY. NEITHER WOULD BE SERVED BY MECHANICAL REDUCTIONS DESIGNED SOLELY TO MAINTAIN "THE EXISTING CORRELATION OF FORCES" IN TERMS OF NATIONALITY, TYPE AND CAPABILITY. BOTH WOULD BE SERVED BY THE PRESENT ALLIED APPROACH

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AND THIS GIVES US A HIGH GROUND IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WE SHOULD SEIZE AND HOLD.

MOREOVER, A MORE REALISTIC AND POSITIVE ASSESSMENT OF NATO'S CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE CAPABILITIES IS NOT TANTAMOUNT TO LROCLAIMING THE EXISTING CORRELATION OF FORCES SATISFACTORY. WE DO HAVE SUBSTANTIAL CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE CAPABILITIES -- AND IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE EAST REALIZE THIS. AND THROUGHOUT MBFR AND BEYOND WE WILL NEED TO CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS TO REALIZE THE FULL POTENTIAL OF OUR INVESTMENT. WITH THIS SAID, THERE REMAIN OBJECTIVE DISPARITIES IN THE CRITICAL CONVENTIONAL GROUND BALANCE THAT ANY MBFR AGREEMENT MUST DEAL WITH IF IT IS TO ENHANCE STABILITY.

FINALLY, IT WILL BE CRITICALLY IMORTANT TO RESIST ANY EFFORT TO DAMAGE THE SUBSTANCE OF ALLIED FORCES OR TO IMPAIR WESTERN EUROPE'S ABILITY TO ASUME A FULL SHARE OF ITS OWN DEFENSE.

IN SUM, WE ARE ALREADY INTO A REAL NEGOTIATION IN VIENNA. THE HIGH STANDARD OF ALLIED CONSULTATION AND COHESION WE HAVE ESTABLISHED IN MBFR OFFERS US EVERY HOPE OF BEING ABLE TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEMS AND CAPITALIZE ON THE PROSPECTS FACING US IN VIENNA.

FUTURE WORK PROGRAM

FINALLY, I WULD LIKE TO OFFER MY THOUGHTS ON OUR WORK FOR THE COMING YEAR. THERE IS, FIRST OF ALL, THE NEED TO COME TO SUBSTANTIAL AGREEMENT ON THE CAPABILITIES OF OUR CONVENTIONAL FORCES, AND TO ACHIEVE BURDEN SHARING AGREEMENTS THAT WILL MEET THE NEEDS OF THE NEXT TWO YEARS WHILE WE ARE MAKING LONGER TERM ARRANGEMENTS. WITH RESPECT TO CONVENTIONAL FORCES, I REPEAT MY STRONGLY HELD VIEWS THAT NATO'S CONVENTIONAL FORCES ARE BECOMING MORE IMPORTANT, NOT LESS, AS THE STRENGTH OF SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES GROWS -- NOT BECAUSE WE WANT TO
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WAGE CONVENTIONAL WAR BUT BECAUSE WE DO NOT WISH TO WAGE ANY WAR.

THEN, THERE ARE A NUMBER OF TASKS WHICH, IN MY JUDGEMENT, ARE URGENTLY IN NEED OF DOING:

1. MAKING CRITICAL IMPROVEMENTS IN THE FORCES. WE SHOULD PRESS ON WITH THE FEW CRITICALLY-NEEDED FORCE IMPROVEMENTS: THE FOLLOW-ON TASKS IN THE ANTITANK WEAPONS, SHELTERS, AND WAR RESERVE STOCK AREAS ARE NOT EASY OR AUTOMATIC. THE EWG IN THE BASIC ISSUES STUDY SHOULD CONTINUE TO EMPHASIZE THESE AREAS AND SHOULD CONSIDER A FEW NEW PROGRAMS, SUCH AS MOBILE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS FOR OUR FIELD FORCES, ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURE CAPABILITIES FOR BOTH AIRCRAFT AND AIR DEFENSE, AND MODERN SOPHISTICATED AIR-DELIVERED MUNITIONS. WE SHOULD NOW EXAMINE THESE DEFICIENCIES, WITH AN EYE TOWARD ESTABLISHING PROGRAMS EARLY IN THESE AREAS.

2. NATO FORCE PLANNING

IN THE BROADEST SENSE, WE MUST NOW CONCENTRATE ON MAKING IT POSSIBLE FOR THE ALLIANCE AND ITS FORCES TO WORK TOGETHER BETTER, RATHER THAN ON DETAILED INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY PLANS. THIS CHALLENGE HAS BOTH POLITICAL AND MILITARY DIMENSIONS.

POLITICALLY, WE DEFENSE MINISTERS NEED TO IMPROVE OUR OWN DIALOGUE ON NATO'S STRATEGIC INTERESTS WITHIN AND OUTSIDE THE NATO AREA. NATO, AS WE HAVE RECENTLY WITNESSED, CAN ALL TOO EASILY BE AFFECTED, SOMETIMES PROFOUNDLY, BY WHAT HAPPENS OUTSIDE THE TREATY AREA.

WE DEFENSE MINISTERS SHOULD ALSO SEEK TO IMPROVE THE NATO FORCE PLANNING SYSTEM. WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT THERE ARE NOT GOING TO BE LARGE NEW FORCES OR MANPOWER, AND THAT FUNDS ARE UNLIKELY TO RISE MUCH FASTER THAN THEY HAVE OVER THE LAST THREE OR FOUR YEARS. THEREFORE, OUR TASK IS TO MAKE THE BEST USE OF THE AVAILABLE RESOURCES FOR THE COMMON BENEFIT.

WE SHOULD ENGAGE IN THE FULLEST AND FRANKEST SHARING OF DETAILED INFORMATION ON THE FORCES WE OWN AND BUY, RECOGNIZING THE TOTALITY OF OUR FORCES, NOT JUST WHAT WE FORMALLY COMMIT. WE SHOULD SHARE FULLY THE RATIONALES BEHIND DECISIONS, AND THE
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REASONS FOR EXPERIMENTS AND INNOVATIONS.

WE WILL TABLE BEFORE THE SPRING MEETING OUR PROPOSALS TO IMPROVE THE PRESENT PLANNING SYSTEM.

3. FORCE READINESS. INSURING THAT THE FORCES ARE READY AND THAT THEY CAN WORK TOGETHER ARE THE MOST IMPORTANT RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NATO MILITARY COMMANDERS. OUR EXPERIENCE HERE-- AMONG OTHER THINGS I THINK OF THE DIFFICULTIES WE HAVE HAD IN MAKING MORE FLEXIBLE USE OF OUR AIR ASSETS -- DOES STRONGLY SUGGEST THAT WE NEED TO WORK MUCH HARDER AT THIS. THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES CAN DO A VALUABLE JOB IN MONITORING READINESS AND TRAINING, ORGANIZING AND EXERCISING COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS, AND PUSHING A VERY FEW, DEFINITE PROGRAMS.

IN ADDITION, THE UNITED STATES HAS UNDERWAY AN EXAMINATION OF OUR AIR AND SEA-LIFT FORCES AND OF OTHER MEASURES DESIGNED TO MOVE UNITS TO EUROPE ON AN ACCELERATED SCHEDULE. I WILL REPORT TO YOU OUR RESULTS IN DUE COURSE.
RUMSFELD

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 IO-14 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03 NEA-10

NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 USIA-15 TRSE-00

SAJ-01 DRC-01 /096 W

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FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3166

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 3550

USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY MADRID

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

USCINCEUR

USNMR SHAPE

USLOSACLANT

CINCLANT

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4. DEFENSE EFFICIENCIES. I AM CONVINCED THAT THERE ARE SUBSTANTIAL OPPORTUNITIES TO MAKE BETTER USE OF OUR COLLECTIVE DEFENSE RESOURCES AS WE LOOK TO THE NEXT FIVE YEARS. THERE IS, I AM CERTAIN, MORE GOLD TO BE MINED IN THE PRINCIPLE OF SPECIALIZATION RAISED BY THE NETHERLANDS. FOR EXAMPLE, WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO MAKE BETTER USE OF OUR EXISTING COMBAT FORCES IN EUROPE, OR TO DEPLOY COMBAT FORCES TO EUROPE IN GREATER NUMBERS IN A SHORTER PERIOD, IF OUR ALLIES WOULD PROVIDE THE LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR THEM. OR IF FOR EXAMPLE, ONE ALLY WERE TO TAKE OVER THE CURRENT U.S. FIXED AIR DEFENSE RESPONSIBILITIES, WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO APPLY THE SAVINGS TO COMBAT FORCES IN ANOTHER ROLE (WHICH MIGHT WELL BE LESS MANPOWER INTENSIVE). WE WILL SOONPUT FORWARD, FOR ALLIANCE CONSIDERATION, SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS FOR GREATER SPECIALIZATION.

SIMILARLY, THERE ARE AREAS FOR COOPERATION IN ARMAMENTS DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION WHICH WE OUGHT NOT TO
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LET PASS IF AT ALL POSSIBLE. I KNOW THIS IS AN OLD STORY, BUT WE SHOULD NOT BE OVERWHELMED BY UNFAVORABLE PAST EXPERIENCE. OUR CONTINUOUS DUPLICATION AND PROLIFERATION OF SIMILAR WEAPON SYSTEMS RESULTS IN UNNECESSARY WASTE OF OUR COLLECTIVE R&D AND LOGISTIC RESOURCES. THE LACK OF WEAPONS STANDARDIZATION SERIOUSLY IMPACTS ON INTEROPERABILITY OF OUR FORCES. WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO LOOK FOR CONSTRUCTIVE OPPORTUNITIES. AS ONE INITIATIVE, THE U.S. IS PRESENTLY EVALUATING THREE SHORT-

RANGE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS -- ROLAND, RAPIER, AND CROTALE -- WHICH HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED IN EUROPE UTILIZING EUROPE'S EXCELLENT TECHNOLOGY. ONE OF THESE SYSTEMS PROBABLY WILL BE SELECTED BY THE U.S. TO MEET ITS REQUIREMENT. SIMILARLY, WE ARE WILLING TO SHARE THE AWACS, A SYSTEM DEVELOPED BY THE U.S. AT AN ULTIMATE COST OF \$1 BILLION AND CONTAINING OUR MOST ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY. THE SYSTEM IS PRESENTLY BEING EVALUATED ON A HIGH PRIORITY BASIS BY THE SHAPE TECHNICAL CENTER AT THE REQUEST OF CNAD FOR POSSIBLE USE IN THE UPGRADING OF NATO AIR DEFENSE AND COMMAND AND CONTROL. WE ARE ALSO COOPERATING ON VTOL TECHNOLOGY. WE HAVE PLANS TO COOPERATE IN TANK ARMAMENT AND MIGHT WELL FIND THIRD GENERATION ANTI-ARMOR SYSTEMS A BENEFICIAL AREA FOR COOPERATION. THERE ARE OTHER POSSIBILITIES, AND WE MINISTERS SHOULD MAKE A DETERMINED EFFORT TO PRESS ON WHEREEVER PRACTICAL.

THE SECRETARY GENERAL IN HIS APPRAISAL HAS ALSO FOCUSED ON THE UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY OFFERED BY THE NECESSITY TO REPLACE THE F-104 WITH A MORE MODERN AIRPLANE. I CERTAINLY SUPPORT HIS VIEW THAT IT WOULD BE REGRETTABLE TO MISS THIS CHANCE FOR A COMMON PROCUREMENT WITH ITS ATTENDANT OPERATIONAL, LOGISTIC AND ECONOMIC BENEFITS.

THERE IS ALSO ROOM FOR ECONOMIES IN NATO MILITARY STAFFS. WITH OUR MANPOWER COSTS CONTINUALLY INCREASING, OUR DEFENSE BUDGETS UNDER SEVERE RESTRICTIONS, AND ANTICIPATED REDUCTIONS IN FORCES IN THE CONTEXT OF MBFR, WE SHOULD LOOK NOW FOR ECONOMIES IN HEADQUARTERS STAFFS. I BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE OVER 18,000 MEN ON THE NATO MILITARY STAFFS. I REALIZE THERE HAS RECENTLY BEEN AGREED A 5 PER CENT REDUCTION IN STAFFS, BUT I RECOMMEND A FURTHER EXAMINATION BE MADE WITH AN EYE TO RATIONALIZATIONS AND ADDITIONAL REDUCTIONS.

I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A PENULTIMATE COMMENT ON SPAIN
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AND NATO. IN THE CONTEXT OF THE AGGREGATE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND FACILITIES AVAILABLE TO FULFILLMENT OF ALLIANCE SECURITY OBJECTIVES, THE UNITED STATES AGAIN WISHES TO EMPHASIZE THE VALUE OF SPAIN'S CONTRIBUTION. NOT ONLY HAS SPAIN CONTINUED TO MAKE FACILITIES AVAILABLE IN SUPPORT OF THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO NATO, BUT IT HAS MADE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN UPGRADING THE QUALITY OF ITS OWN FORCES AND FACILITIES IN A MANNER COMPATIBLE WITH NATO STANDARDS. THE ALLIANCE SHOULD NOT TAKE THIS FOR GRANTED, BUT SHOULD DEVELOP A PROGRAM OF MEASURES TO ENCOURAGE THE EVENTUAL LINKAGE OF SPANISH DEFENSE RESOURCES WITH THOSE OF NATO IN THE CONTEXT OF EUROPE'S OVERALL COMMITMENT TO WESTERN DEFENSE.

FINALLY, I WOULD LIKE TO CONCLUDE MY REMARKS WITH A COMMENT ON THE ROLE OF DEFENSE MINISTERS IN THE CONTINUING DIALOGUE OF THE ALLIANCE, AND PARTICULARLY WITHIN THE DPC FORUM. I BELIEVE WE MUST SEEK TO DISCUSS BROADER ISSUES THAN

HAVE BEEN THE SUBJECT OF RECENT AGENDAS. WE OUGHT TO DISCUSS
NATO'S TASKS AS A WHOLE, NOT JUST PARTICULAR DEFENSE PROGRAMS.
WE SHOULD ADDRESS ALSO THE LARGER GEOPOLITICAL ISSUES. WE
SHOULD PERHAPS INSTITUTIONALIZE THE TWO-HOUR RESTRICTED SESSION
ON OUR FUTURE AGENDA, SUBMITTING OUR PREPARED STATEMENTS FOR THE
RECORD, SO THAT WE HAVE TIME TO DISCUSS THESE LARGER ISSUES
IN A LESS FORMAL WAY. END TEXT.
RUMSFELD

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